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ARTICLES
QUALITATIVE STANDARDS FOR "QUALIFIED
SECURITIES": SEC REGULATION OF
VOTING RIGHTS*
Roberta S. Karmel**
The extent to which a federal corporation law has been created by the
federal securities laws is an ongoing debate. Perhaps because this is a funda-
mental but unsettled question, the debate tends to move to new subjects as
new investor protection problems emerge. In the past, attention has focused
upon the development of a federal common law of fiduciary duty.' More
recently, attention has focused upon the authority of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) to protect the voting rights of common stock-
holders in public corporations.2 This issue has arisen because of charter
amendments, adopted as defenses to tender offers, that create two or more
classes of common stock with disparate voting rights, contrary to the tradi-
tional listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). 3 Yet,
changes in the capital structures of corporations, and the institutionalization
* The date of this Article is February 1, 1987. See Addendum for subsequent
developments.
** Roberta S. Karmel is a Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School and a Partner of
Kelley Drye & Warren. She is a Director of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and was a
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1977-1980. She has a B.A.
from Radcliffe College and an LL.B. from New York University School of Law. A summer
research stipend from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance in the preparation of this Arti-
cle. The research assistance of Brooklyn Law School student, Susan K. Foster, is gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 70 VA. L. REV. 813 (1984); Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law" An Assessment, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965); Friendly, In Praise of Erie--and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964).
2. Compare Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common
Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687 (1986) with Dent, Dual Class Capi-
talization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 725 (1986).
3. See Karmel, Federalizing Shareholder Voting Rights, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 1986, at 33,
col. 3; Karmel, The SEC's Power to Regulate Stockholder Voting Rights, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21,
1986, at 1, col. 1; Karmel, Is One Share, One Vote Archaic?, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 26, 1985, at 1, col.
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of the public securities markets, make the issues raised more complex and
far-reaching than the question of whether the SEC can mandate a one share,
one vote rule for publicly traded common stock.
The old shibboleths to the effect that a corporation is managed by its
board of directors,4 for the benefit of the shareholders, who are the owners of
the corporation,5 no longer seem to match economic reality or legal theory.6
Rather, corporate governance today involves directors of large public corpo-
rations in the allocation of economic and political power among manage-
ment, public, and institutional investors, and other interested constituencies.
Both stockholders and bondholders tend to be short term claimants of the
assets and cash flow of an enterprise,7 and the enforcement of corporate gov-
ernance obligations frequently has political rather than economic objectives.'
The author will argue that under the 1975 amendments to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),9 the SEC has limited, but significant
power to regulate corporate governance. The inevitable exercise of this
power is likely to alter the balance between federal and state corporate law.
I. THE SECURITIES LAWS AS A SOURCE OF FEDERAL
CORPORATION LAW
In the commercial arena, federalism is a juggling act between the virtues
of uniformity and national economic growth on the one hand, and policy
experimentation and decentralized power on the other hand. As a general
matter, despite repeated clamor for a federal chartering law for large public
companies, 10 corporation law has remained the province of state legislatures
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1986).
5. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931).
6. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1976); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & EcON. 395 (1983). But see
Werner, Corporation Law in Search of its Future, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1611 (1981); Clark, The
Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 561 (1981).
7. McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413, 416 (1986).
This was the frequently expressed view of Harold M. Williams when he was Chairman of the
SEC. See Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173,
180 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir.
1979); Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F. Supp.
328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); REPORT OF THE SEC ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE
PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES TO THE SENATE COMMITrEE ON BANKING, HOUSING AND UR-
BAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2ND SESS. (Comm. Print 1976); see also H. KRIPKE, THE SEC
AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 18-20 (1979).
9. Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
10. R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976);
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Ha-
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and state corporation law is still the enabling legislation for corporations.II
However, the federal securities laws have encroached upon state sovereignty
to a limited extent, primarily by using disclosure as a regulatory device to
influence the conduct of corporate managements and boards. 2
In addition to federal and state corporation law, state securities regulation
supplements federal securities regulation. Securities commissions in every
state are permitted to exist by "savings clauses" in both the Securities Act of
1933 (Securities Act) 3 and the Exchange Act. 14 State securities legislation
is regulatory rather than enabling and, at least in the "merit" states, ad-
dresses governance matters along with matters relating to capital
structure. '
5
As if this plethora of law were not sufficient, the scheme of federal securi-
ties regulation includes a significant role for self-regulatory organizations
(SROs) such as stock exchanges and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (NASD). 16 Although the primary function of SROs is to li-
cense and regulate enterprises and their employees who are participants in
the securities markets, SRO rules also address several matters of corporation
law. Listing requirements are of particular significance.
A. Legislative Provisions
When the first federal securities law, the Securities Act, was passed in
1933, financial regulation seemed a marginal part of the New Deal. Yet,
vast sums of money had been lost by the public in the stock market and
zen, Corporate Chartering and the Securities Markets: Shareholder Suffrage, Corporate Re-
sponsibility and Managerial Accountability, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 391; Henning, Federal
Corporate Charteringfor Big Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DE PAUL L. REV.
915 (1972); Schwartz, A Case for Federal Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125
(1976).
11. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 1780-1970 (1970); Folk, State Statutes: Their Role in Prescribing Norms of
Responsible Management Conduct, 31 Bus. LAW. 1031, 1032 (1976).
12. Former SEC Chairman William Cary wrote that "disclosure restrains because of sen-
sitivity to public reaction, caution about response to the 'dissent' shareholder, and the possibil-
ity of legal action." Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 408, 411
(1962).
13. Securities Act of 1933, § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1982).
14. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
15. Brandi, Securities Practitioners and Blue Sky Laws: A Survey of Comments and a
Ranking of States by Stringency of Regulation, 10 J. CORP. LAW 689 (1985); Ad Hoc Subcom-
mittee on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Securities Committee, Report on State
Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, American Bar Association 41 Bus. LAW. 785 (1986)
[hereinafter ABA Report].
16. See Miller, Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets: A Critical Examination, 42
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 853 (1985).
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investor confidence was at a low ebb. In order to encourage capital invest-
ment in enterprise, federal action was deemed necessary. The Senate Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency conducted a highly publicized investigation
into stock exchange, banking, and capital markets practices and exposed
stock manipulation, insider trading, and breaches of fiduciary duty by corpo-
rate managers. 7 Although a consensus in favor of federal legislation was
thus formed, there was considerable debate as to the character of such
regulation.
One group advocated the full disclosure view, suggested many years
before by Louis D. Brandeis: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy
for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfec-
tants; electric light the most efficient policeman.""8 Others argued for more
direct control of the sale of securities by the federal government. Early
drafts of federal legislation would have prohibited any securities distribution
by an issuer if the business of the company or its securities were not sound or
the issuer was found to be dishonest or in unsound condition.19 The Securi-
ties Act was a political compromise between critics of bankers, corporate
directors, and accountants who questioned the value of the private enterprise
system and the business community which strenuously objected to the con-
trol of capital raising by a federal bureaucracy. Full disclosure, rather than
merit review, was selected as a regulatory model.
Yet, when the Exchange Act was passed a year later, substantive corpora-
tion law standards were injected into federal law. Short swing profits by
officers, directors, and major stockholders in the securities of their compa-
nies were prohibited.2" Federal control was imposed over the proxy solicita-
tions of large public companies.21 Of great future importance, a catch all
antifraud provision was enacted, giving the SEC some rulemaking authority
with regard to fiduciary duties.22
An accretion of corporate governance standards flowed from subsequent
legislation. The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 193523 imposed
various substantive controls upon capital structure. The Trust Indenture
Act of 193924 gave substantive protections to the bondholders of public cor-
porations and assured that their rights would be protected by indenture
17. See F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH: THE STORY OF OUR MODERN
MONEY CHANGERS (1939).
18. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HoW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
19. See D. RITCHIE & J. LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS 43-52 (1980).
20. Exchange Act, § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982).
21. Id. § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n.
22. Id. § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982).
24. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa to 77bbbb (1982).
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trustees. The Investment Company Act of 194025 created a corporate gov-
ernance structure for mutual funds, and in particular, a requirement for con-
trol by independent directors.
2 6
The Securities Act gave the SEC direct control of securities distributions,
but little other control over day-to-day corporate conduct. However, major
amendments to the securities laws in 196427 gave the SEC power to direct a
continuous disclosure system for all public corporations. The SEC's ten-
dency to use disclosure for its prophylactic effect at times has gone so far as
to invite criticism. A 1977 Advisory Committee to the SEC was prompted
to recommend that the "Commission should not adopt disclosure require-
ments which have as their principal objective the regulation of corporate
conduct."2 8
The 1968 Williams Act amendments to the Exchange Act2 9 gave the SEC
regulatory authority over tender offers. Although for the most part these
amendments followed a disclosure mode of regulation, the legislation also
contained substantive provisions dictating the conduct of contests for corpo-
rate control.
In the context of a judicial climate that favored implied rights of action
and liberal interpretations of remedial statutes,3° the SEC was able to utilize
enforcement cases and disclosure rules to impose its notions about corporate
governance on public companies. In a wide variety of management fraud
cases,3" disclosure rules concerning management remuneration, 32 and hear-
ings concerning corporate accountability, 33 the SEC indicated its interest in
generally regulating corporate governance. In recent years, the securities
laws were amended to give the SEC significant new powers for doing so. In
1977, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,34 giving the SEC
direct authority to regulate the internal accounting controls of public corpo-
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 8a-64 (1982).
26. Investment Company Act of 1940, § 10(a), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1982).
27. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565; see Ex-
change Act Release No. 7425 (Sept. 15, 1964), 29 Fed. Reg. 13,455 (Sept. 30, 1964).
28. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SESS.
305, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE SEC (Comm.
Print 1977).
29. Exchange Act, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
30. See Loss, Introduction: The Federal Securities Code-Its Purpose, Plan, and Progress,
30 VAND. L. REV. 315 (1977).
31. See R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 146-53 (1982).
32. Securities Act Release No. 5856 (Aug. 18, 1977); Item 402, Regulation S-K, 17
C.F.R. § 229.402 (1986); see H. KRIPKE, supra note 8, at 18-19.
33. Exchange Act Release No. 13,901 (Aug. 29, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 44,860 (Sept. 7,
1977); Exchange Act Release No. 13,482 (Apr. 28, 1977), 42 Fed. Reg. 23,901 (May 11, 1977).
34. Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-
2, 78ff (1982)).
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rations. In addition, in 1984 Congress included in the Insider Trading Sanc-
tions Act 35 a new administrative power to sanction corporate officers
responsible for false filings with the SEC.36 It can be anticipated that when
the times are politically opportune, the agency will utilize this power to force
its corporate governance ideas upon public companies. a
Yet, the most powerful weapon which the SEC has for federalizing corpo-
rate governance is its power to define "qualified securities" in a national
market system, a' added to the Exchange Act in 1975.39 In the same statute,
Congress gave the SEC plenary power over SRO rulemaking.4 The poten-
tial for utilizing these powers to supplant state corporation and. securities
laws will be discussed below.
The purpose of this overview of various amendments to the federal securi-
ties laws is to point out that, although these are primarily disclosure statutes,
they are not exclusively disclosure statutes. Rather, over the course of fifty
years, Congress has given the SEC, in bits and pieces, significant substantive
power to regulate the relationship between the management of public corpo-
rations and their shareholders. Although Congress has resisted federal char-
tering," this does not mean that no federal corporation law exists. Yet,
because the SEC does not have a clear mandate for regulating internal cor-
porate affairs, and because the federal securities laws focus upon investor
protection in order to maintain fair and honest securities markets, commen-
tators generally assume the absence of a federal corporation law. Neverthe-
less, championing the rights of investors against management, and enlisting
the services of directors, accountants, and attorneys to do so,42 is acting to
allocate power among various corporate constituencies. This is the essence
of corporate governance, and it has been the work of the SEC for over fifty
years.
B. Limitations on Federal Corporation Law
The judiciary has found the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
35. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264-65 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78o(d)(2), 78f(a) (Supp. H 1984)).
36. Exchange Act, § 15(e)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 780(c)(4).
37. See Karmel, Increasing the SEC's Administrative Authority, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 19, 1984,
at 1, col. 1.
38. Exchange Act, § I IA(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78ki(a)(2).
39. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78, 80 (1982)).
40. Exchange Act, § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 78s.
41. Federal chartering legislation was introduced by Congressman Ben Rosenthal, H.R.
7010, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 7489 (1980), but never progressed.
42. See R. KARMEL, supra note 31, at 173-83.
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laws a tempting source for developing a federal corporation law. Implied
rights of action under section 10(b)4 3 and section 14(a)" of the Exchange
Act have been recognized in a variety of cases involving corporate misman-
agement. From time to time, the courts countenanced not only cases involv-
ing misrepresentation but also cases involving equitable fraud or breaches of
fiduciary duty by corporate management in dealing with shareholders.4 5
This led one commentator to declare that the federal securities laws had
given rise to a federal corporation law.4 6
However, in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,47 the Supreme Court at-
tempted to quash the development of a judge made federal law of corporate
fiduciary duty. This case was an effort by the minority shareholders in a
squeeze out merger, sanctioned by Delaware statute, to contest the appraisal
value of their shares by alleging unfairness and overreaching. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took the view that rule lOb-5
reached "breaches of fiduciary duty by a majority against minority share-
holders without any charge of misrepresentation or lack of disclosure.
4
1
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that section 10(b) cases require
deception, manipulation, or nondisclosure.
In so doing, the Court rejected the notion that the securities laws "federal-
ize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that deals with transac-
tions in securities, particularly where established state policies of corporate
regulation would be overridden."49 That is, since fiduciary self-dealing is
traditionally left to state regulation, whatever need may exist for uniform
federal fiduciary standards should be specifically addressed by Congress, and
not implied by the courts. Whether the SEC can or should articulate such a
standard in certain types of corporate transactions is another matter that
was not addressed by the Court.
In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,5 o the Supreme Court indicated
that Sante Fe would not be confined to its facts, but rather was a general
43. These rights of action were first recognized in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), but not specifically approved by the Supreme Court until 1971 in
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
44. These rights of action were first recognized by the Supreme Court in 1964 in J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
45. See, e.g., Shell v. Hensley, 430 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1970); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,
405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964).
46. "[A] federal law of corporations now exists. But it has always existed-since the pas-
sage of the Securities Act of 1933." Fleischer, supra note 1, at 1179.
47. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
48. Green v. Sante Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976).
49. 430 U.S. at 479.
50. 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
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holding concerning corporate fiduciary duty. Schreiber raised the issue of
whether the withdrawal of a hostile tender offer bid and the substitution of a
partial bid, following negotiations with the target company's management,
constituted a "manipulative" act under section 14(e) of the Exchange Act.
The Court held that the term "manipulative" in sections 10(b) and 14(e)
should be similarly interpreted and that manipulative acts require misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure.
Taken together, Sante Fe and Schreiber place a breach of fiduciary duty,
which is fully disclosed by officers or directors to shareholders, beyond the
ambit of implied rights of action under the federal securities laws. Whether
the SEC may have more latitude in rulemaking than a private litigant in a
damage action is another issue. In Schreiber, the Court pointed out that in
the 1970 amendments to the Williams Act, Congress gave the SEC "latitude
to regulate nondeceptive activities as a 'reasonably designed' means of
preventing manipulative acts."51
II. REGULATION OF VOTING RIGHTS
The SEC's authority to regulate corporate governance is being seriously
tested by changes in the voting rights policy of the NYSE. In response to
the threat of hostile tender offers some corporations have recapitalized for
the purpose of transferring voting control from public shareholders to insid-
ers, sometimes as a means to maintain control by a management or family
group, or sometimes as a means to give management control. Such share-
holder disenfranchisement has raised serious legal and policy questions.
This Article addresses the question whether the SEC has the authority to
mandate a one share, one vote voting rights policy for public corporations.
A. NYSE Listing Standards
The current minimum NYSE requirement, set forth in section 313 of the
NYSE's Listed Company Manual, is that holders of common stock have
equal voting rights."2 Since 1926, the NYSE has refused to list any company
with nonvoting common stock or any company with more than one class of
common stock having disparate voting rights.53 This prohibition is known
51. Id. at 11 n.11.
52. NYSE Listed Company Manual § 313.00(A) & (C) (1985).
53. Id. Similarly, the Exchange recommends that listed preferred stock have minimum
voting rights. Id. § 313.00(E). For example, the preferred stock should have the right to elect
at least two directors in the event of a default on the equivalent of six quarterly dividends. Id.
Likewise, 66 2/3% of the preferred stock, voting as a separate class, must approve any charter
amendment materially altering the rights associated with the preferred stock. Id. However,
NYSE policy does not prevent the issuance of preferred stock with full voting rights, assuming
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as the "one share, one vote" policy. Moreover, the NYSE will delist the
stock of a company that creates a class of nonvoting common stock. 54
Currently, the NYSE permits a very limited type of "dual class capitaliza-
tion," called the "proportionate voting power" exception." In this type of
capitalization, there is an issuance of a second class of common stock in
which the voting rights associated with the second class are reasonably re-
lated to that security's equity contribution. However, creation of a second
class of common stock with disproportionate voting rights unrelated to eq-
uity rights would result in delisting from the NYSE. Similarly, the NYSE
objects to the creation of a second class of common stock which tends to
restrict or nullify the voting power of the issuer's existing common stock.56
The most prevalent example is where a second class of common stock, nor-
mally privately held or controlled by insiders, has the ability, as a class, to
elect a majority of a company's board of directors.
Since June 1984 there has been a moratorium on delistings based on dual
class capitalizations which contravene the NYSE's policies on voting
rights." Over twenty-five NYSE issuers are now in violation of its listing
requirements.58
Reacting to such changes in corporate structure and increased competi-
the security's voting power is in a reasonable relationship to its equity contribution. Id.
§ 313.00(D). Moreover, although nonlisted preferred stock does not have to comply with any
minimum voting requirement, the NYSE would review the security's voting provisions to as-
sure that the common shareholders' rights are not being infringed upon, such as disproportion-
ate voting power, or the ability of holders of preferred stock, voting as a class, to block a
merger or acquisition.
54. Id. § 313.00(A). However, special stock of quasi-governmental corporations, like the
Student Loan Marketing Association, are not subject to the voting requirement. Id.
55. Id. § 313.00(D). The Exchange has not established a fixed standard for making the
"reasonable relationship" determination and, therefore, when a proportionate voting issue is
before the Exchange, it is analyzed on a case-by-case basis.
56. Id. § 313.00(C). Similarly, because certain voting arrangements tend to restrict or
nullify voting rights of shareholders, the Exchange also objects to voting trusts, irrevocable
proxies and similar provisions. Id. § 313.00(B).
57. See Carey, End of an Era, FIN. WORLD, Aug. 19, 1986, at 14; see also NYSE Opens Its
Doors With Change In 50-Year Old Rule, Reuters, July 4, 1986 (article reported on wire
service).
58. Nash, Big Board Defends Plan On 2 Classes of Shares, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1986, at
Dl, col. I; Testimony of John J. Phelan, Jr. before the SEC, Dec. 16, 1986. General Motors
Corp., Hershey Corp., Dow Jones & Co., and Coastal Corp. are examples of companies that
have issued dual classes of common stock in direct violation of the NYSE's voting rights pol-
icy. However, the NYSE has permitted them to continue trading while the rule is under re-
view. See Vise, NYSE Ends "One-Share, One-Vote Rule"; Firms Will Be Allowed to Have 2
Classes of Common Stock with Unequal Voting Rights, Wash. Post, July 4, 1986, at Fl, col. 2;
Vise, GM Runs Afoul of NYSE Rule; Created New Class of Stock to Pay for Hughes Deal,
Wash. Post, June 7, 1985, at B1, col. 4; McMurray, Big Board Panel Likely to Urge Change in
Rules, Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1984, at 2, col. 2.
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tion among marketplaces, on September 16, 1986 the NYSE filed with the
SEC proposed amendments to section 313 of its Listed Company Manual.5 9
These proposed changes in the listing standards would allow for a variety of
dual class recapitalizations if approved by the owners of a majority of the
public shareholders and a majority of the independent directors. Public
shareholders would be defined as "beneficial owners of the issuer's voting
equity securities who are not directors, officers or members of their immedi-
ate families," and who are not beneficial owners of ten percent or more of
the voting power of the voting equity securities.' Thus, the equity securities
of a listed company could have disparate voting rights, concentrating control
in a management or insider group. However, shares of common stock could
not be nonvoting.61
Under the proposed rule change, a grandfather provision would permit
listed companies, which have created disparate voting rights since April
1984, two years from the date of effectiveness to achieve compliance with the
approval requirements. However, a company requesting to list under the
new rules would be required to obtain the requisite approval prior to listing
on the NYSE. The proposed rule change also would allow for two excep-
tions from the approval requirements. First, a company would not be sub-
ject to the approval requirements if it distributes pro rata among its common
shareholders shares of disparate voting rights stock in a "spin-off" of assets.
Second, the approval requirements would not apply to a company with ex-
isting disparate voting rights if such stock was outstanding at the time the
company first went "public."
62
In accordance with customary procedures, this proposed change in the
rules of an SRO was filed with the SEC in conformity with rule 19b-4, under
section 19(b) of the Exchange Act, 63 pursuant to which the SEC is required
to follow a notice and comment procedure before acting to approve or disap-
prove such a rule change. The SEC held public hearings on the NYSE's
proposed rule change on December 16 and 17, 1986, indicating the impor-
59. Amendments to Section 313.00 of the NYSE Listed Company Manual, File No. SR-
NYSE-86-17 (proposed Sept. 16, 1986) (hereinafter NYSE 19b-4 Filing]; see Big Board Agrees
to Let Companies List More Than One Class of Stock, Wall St. J., July 7, 1986, at 2, col. 3;
Russell, Manic Market, TIME, Nov. 10, 1986, at 70.
60. NYSE 19b-4 Filing, supra note 59, at 25.
61. Id. at 24.
62. Id. at 25-26. A company becomes "public" when it has a class of voting equity secur-
ity held of record of 500 shareholders. The NYSE selected the 500 shareholder definition
because of a company's obligation to register as a public company under section 12(g) of the
Exchange Act. Id. at 19.
63. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1985) (promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (1982)).
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tance and difficulty of the issues involved.'
In 1985, John Phelan, Chairman of the NYSE, testifying before a congres-
sional panel, stated:
The Exchange believes the qualitative listing standards developed
and refined over the past half-century or more-including the "one
share, one vote" policy-have been good for its listed companies,
good for their shareholders and good for this country .... Philo-
sophically, the Exchange still believes in it .... But the world is
changing very rapidly and the issue transcends the New York
Stock Exchange .... And the national competitive environment
may very well preclude the Exchange from unilaterally retaining
one share, one vote.65
B. Amex and NASD Requirements
The NYSE's proposed rule change triggered congressional reaction, in-
cluding the introduction of legislation that would require companies listed
not only on the NYSE, but also on the American Stock Exchange (Amex)
and NASDAQ/NMS, to have a single class of common stock with equal
voting rights.66 The stated objective of the proposed legislation was to pre-
serve the one share, one vote concept and thus prevent a "race to the bot-
tom" among the major exchanges.67
Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman of the Amex, told a House subcommittee
that abandonment of the one share, one vote rule by the NYSE would be
damaging to the securities markets, and particularly to the Amex.68 Levitt
estimated that if the NYSE abandoned its rule, between 200 to 300 major
corporations would adopt dual classes of common stock. He also posited a
"substantial" loss of revenue because some companies listed on the Amex
64. Exchange Act Release No. 23,803 (Nov. 13, 1986) [hereinafter SEC Voting Rights
Hearings]; see Nash, supra note 58, at D1, col. 1; Raider Repellant, TIME, Dec. 29, 1986, at 62.
65. NYSE 19b-4 Filing, supra note 59, at 17-18.
66. S. 1314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2783, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
67. Specifically, Senator Alfonse D'Amato (R-N.Y.), Chairman of the Securities Subcom-
mittee of the Senate Banking Committee and sponsor of S. 1314, stated that "[niow in the face
of strong competitive pressures from the American Stock Exchange and NASDAQ, the New
York Stock Exchange is considering lowering its listing standards to match the lower stan-
dards of the other exchanges. This race to the bottom must be halted." 131 CONG. REC. 8318
(1985). In the same vein, Congressman John Dingell (D-Mich.), chief sponsor of H.R. 2783,
noted that "[i]f two class common [stock] is permitted, and becomes widely used, one of the
market mechanisms for accountability will be removed and the exchanges may find themselves
engaged in a 'race for the bottom' as marketplaces compete for listings and trading volumes."
The Introduction of Legislation Promoting Shareholder Democracy, Press Release (June 18,
1985).
68. Amex Chief Says Congress Should Consider One Share/One Vote Rule for Amex,
NASD, Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. 100, at A-3 (May 23, 1985).
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would transfer to the NYSE. Levitt, therefore, advocated a uniform one
share, one vote requirement for the NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ listed
companies.69
Currently, the Amex permits dual class capitalizations that involve une-
qual voting rights.7" The Amex rule, known as the "Wang Formula,"7 1 the-
oretically provides that the ratio of differential votes per share cannot be
more than one to ten.72 The Amex will not now approve the listing of non-
voting common stock,7 3 but it has threatened to eliminate its voting rights
policies altogether if the NYSE proposed amendments to its listing standards
are approved by the SEC.74
By contrast, the NASD, which maintains the NASDAQ trading system
for over-the-counter securities that meet certain standards, has no require-
ment regarding voting rights.75 Furthermore, the results of an NASD com-
missioned study conducted by Professor Daniel Fischel of the University of
Chicago Law School concluded that the NASD should not consider or
adopt requirements with regard to voting stock.7 6
It is noteworthy, however, that the NASD is seeking SEC authority to
establish listing criteria for its NMS securities. Under this proposal, the
NASD would create listing standards in the same manner as the national
69. Id.; see Ingersoll & Swartz, Amex Head Warns of Regulatory Excess if Big Board
Drops Voting Rule on Stock, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1986, at 36, col. 1. Commentators continue
to question Amex's long-term viability as an equities market. See, e.g., Sonenclar, Hanging on
at the Amex, FIN. WORLD, Sept. 16, 1986, at 82. Company listings on the Amex are one-third
lower than ten years ago. Id. In equity volume, the Amex placed fifth among the American
exchanges in 1985. Id.
70. Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) § 122 (1985); Two Class Issues Listed on the Amex,
American Stock Exchange, Resource Investment Banking Services (June 1, 1986).
71. See Study Predicts NYSE Will Permit Dual Classes of Stock With Unequal Voting
Rights, Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. 21, at A-2 (Jan. 31, 1986). The Amex rule was initiated
for Wang Corp. Wang's dual class capitalization is designed to prevent management from
being ousted. At present the Amex has 91 listed companies with dual class capitalizations.
72. Two Class Issues Listed on the Amex, supra note 70. Pursuant to Amex policy, estab-
lishment of a two class issue also requires that the limited voting class have the ability to elect
not less than 25% of the board of directors. Id. In addition, "[i]f the percentage of outstand-
ing common stock represented by the 'super' voting class becomes less than 12 1/2%, then the
limited voting class acquires the additional right of voting with the 'super' voting class for the
remaining 75% of the directors." Id. Although the Amex does not require that a dividend
preference be established for the limited voting issue, it is "strongly recommended." Id.
73. Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCH) § 122 (1985).
74. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 23,951 (Jan. 2, 1987); Amex to Seek SEC Ap-
proval of Change to End Curbs on Unequal Voting Rights, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1713
(Nov. 28, 1986).
75. D. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock 2
(Feb. 1986) (NASD Study); see also Study Predicts NYSE Will Permit Dual Classes of Stock
With Unequal Voting Rights, supra note 71, at A-2.
76. D. Fischel, supra note 75.
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stock exchanges. Moreover, the NASD has proposed to establish some cor-
porate governance standards, for example, requiring independent directors
for NASDAQ issuers.77
C. State Law
A survey of state corporation law provisions regulating voting rights is
beyond the scope of this Article. As a general matter, however, articles of
incorporation denying voting rights to one class of common stock in the
election of directors does not violate the public policy of state corporation
laws.78 However, in certain extraordinary circumstances, nonvoting com-
mon stockholders may exercise a limited franchise.79
More specific regulation of the voting rights of common stockholders is
found in state securities laws rather than in state corporation laws. Every
state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico has a securities regulation
statute, but not all state "blue sky" regulation is merit regulation. A merit
regulator has the authority to prevent an issuer from selling securities in the
state because the offering or the issuer's capital structure is substantively
unfair or presents excessive risk to the investor.8°
Although the blue sky laws vary from state to state, they all contain a
requirement for registration of securities to be sold in the state. However,
most state securities laws currently provide an exemption from their securi-
ties registration requirements to issuers which are listed on a national securi-
ties exchange. This is known as the "blue chip" exemption. Some states also
provide an exemption for certain over-the-counter securities.81
Controversy over these exemptions has come from two contradictory de-
velopments. First, the NASD has been urging that broader exemptions be
77. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 22,506 (Oct. 4, 1985), 50 Fed. Reg. 41,769 (Oct.
15, 1985).
78. See, e.g., Hampton v. Tri-State Fin. Corp., 30 Colo. App. 420, 495 P.2d 566 (1972);
General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 87 N.J. Eq. 234, 100 A. 347 (1917); 5 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2026 (perm. ed. 1976 &
Supp. 1986); 11 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 5086 (perm. ed. 1986); 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 2D § 15 (1971). But see Stroh v.
Blackhawk Holding Corp., 117 Ill. App. 2d 301,307-08, 253 N.E.2d 692, 695-96 (1969) (under
Illinois Constitution and Business Corporation Act, the rights of shareholders with respect to
different classes of shares of corporate stock can be limited in every way except with respect to
voting.), aff'd, 48 Ill. 2d 471, 272 N.E.2d 1 (1971). The vitality of this case, however, is
questionable. See Roanoke Agency v. Edgar, 101 Ill.2d 315, 461 N.E.2d 1365 (1984).
79. See, e.g., DuVall v. Moore, 276 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Iowa 1967).
80. ABA Report, supra note 15, at 787.
81. Id. at 833-35. Fifteen states have such an exemption: Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Ken-
tucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wyoming.
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adopted by states so that securities listed on NASDAQ and/or securities
designated as "NMS securities ' 82 will be exempt from blue sky registration
requirements. Second, the pendency of the NYSE amendments to its listing
standards, discussed above, which would permit dual class capitalization re-
sulting in nonvoting or restricted voting stock, has caused some state regula-
tors to consider elimination of the blue chip exemption in view of merit
standards addressed to voting rights.
Blue sky provisions dealing with shareholder voting rights generally are
promulgated under a fair and equitable standard. Such restrictions are in-
tended to keep promoters from obtaining public financing without relin-
quishing some company control to the public. s3 States which have rules
mandating such rights seek to provide equity between classes of stock,
although preferential rights to either dividends or distributions on liquida-
tion may provide the necessary justification for unequal voting rights. Cur-
rently, thirteen states have merit restrictions relating to voting rights.84
A North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)
Statement of Policy on Non-Voting Stock places restrictions on the issuance
of unequal voting stock. Under the Statement of Policy, unless preferential
treatment as to dividends and liquidation is provided with respect to publicly
offered securities or the differentiation is otherwise justified, an offering or
proposed offering of equity securities by an issuer having more than one class
of equity security authorized or outstanding, shall be considered unfair and
inequitable to public investors if the class of equity securities offered to the
public (a) has no voting rights, or (b) has less than equal voting rights, in
proportion to the number of shares of each class outstanding, on all matters,
including the election of members to the board of directors of the issuer.8 5
This type of merit review has been adopted in Alaska, Indiana, Missouri,
and Nebraska. 6
In March 1986, NASAA approved a Report and Recommendation from
the NASAA Committee of State Registration Exemptions on the issues of an
82. "National Market System Securities" as defined in SEC Rule 1 lAa-2-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.1lAa-2-1 (1986) pursuant to § 11A(a)(2) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2)
(1982).
83. H. SOWARDS & N. HIRSCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-BLUE SKY REGULATION
§§ 7A.02 & 7A.03 (1986); Brandi, supra note 15, at 700.
84. The states with voting rights restrictions are: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida,
Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas, and Washing-
ton. Iowa rescinded its restriction on August 21, 1985.
85. NASAA Statement of Policy on Non-Voting Stock, NASAA Reports (CCH) 2401
(adopted Sept. 17, 1980).
86. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 3 AAC 08.210, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 8434, at
4428 (1984); IND. ADMIN. CODE § 710 IAC 1-12-4, IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 24,590, at
19,463 (1986); Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 15, § 30-52.110, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 35,461, at
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NMS exemption and an exchange exemption.87 In the context of controver-
sies over possible changes in listing standards relating to voting rights and
any expansion of the blue chip exemption, the NASAA Committee Report
recommended that instead of a blue chip exemption (specifying for example,
NYSE securities), the blue sky commissioner should designate the criteria
for any blue chip exemption in a model rule. Thus, state administrators
would have the power to certify appropriate blue chip standards, rather than
delegate their ability to set criteria for an SRO. Further, the proposed model
rule would require exempt issuers, among other things, to have at least two
independent directors and no nonvoting common stock. If two classes of
voting stock are outstanding, the class with the lesser voting rights would be
required to have the right to elect at least 25% of the directors of the issuer.
Further, the voting disparity between the classes could be no greater than
ten to one.88
As the foregoing indicates, the primary sources of regulatory authority
over shareholder voting rights are state blue sky laws and NYSE listing re-
quirements. Because of the blue chip exemption, and the variation in state
blue sky laws, the NYSE voting rights policy has become a uniform national
standard for large public companies. The extent to which this standard has
the dignity of federal law, however, is unclear.
III. SEC REGULATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL
Although the allocation of power among management, boards, and share-
holders is generally regulated by state law, in contests for control of large
30,532 (1986); NEB. SECURITIES RULES, tit. 48, ch. 8, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 37,408, at
32,505-06 (1984).
The Minnesota regulations go one step further to say that there will be no registration of
securities with unequal voting rights, unless the commissioner in his discretion deems such
substitutes satisfactory. MINN. R. 2875.3080, IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 33,501, at 28,436
(1984). Similarly, Texas and Wyoming permit the commissioner to determine that preferential
treatment justifies unequal voting rights. TEX. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 113.3(6), 3 Blue Sky L.
Rep. (CCH) 55,583, at 49,251 (1986); Wyo. SECURITIES RULE § 3(j), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 66,433, at 57,507 (1986).
Another slight modification to the NASAA statement exists in the Wis. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.07, 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 64,527, at 56,520-21 (1986). Whereas the NASAA state-
ment provides the offering shall be deemed unfair and inequitable if voting rights are unequal
and preferential treatment is absent, the Wisconsin statute states the offering may be deemed
unfair and inequitable if common stock has no voting rights. Less than equal voting rights
may be justified by preferential treatment. Id.
87. NASAA Agrees to Propose Amendments to '56 Uniform Act at Spring Meeting, 18 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 399 (Mar. 21, 1986); NASAA Committee Report on State Registration
Exemptions, 18 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 206 (Feb. 7, 1986).
88. NASAA Agrees to Propose Amendments to '56 Uniform Act at Spring Meeting, supra
note 87.
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public companies, the federal securities laws and in particular the SEC's
proxy and tender offer rules, regulate the conduct of the players. In view of
the enormous aggregations of power and wealth that are transferred in the
market for corporate control, and the impact of such transfers upon the na-
tional economy, federal regulation of this process is not inappropriate.
A. Proxy Regulations
The federal securities laws, which were enacted in 1933 and 1934, did not
provide specifically that common stockholders should enjoy voting rights
commensurate with their economic investment in a public company. How-
ever, the laws arguably presumed the existence of a vote by shareholders by
granting the SEC power, specifically in section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, to
regulate proxy solicitations "as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors."89 Congress was of the view that indi-
viduals involved in the management of companies owned by the investing
public should not be permitted to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of
corporate proxies.90
Rather than regulate proxy solicitations directly, however, Congress en-
trusted the exchanges, subject to somewhat limited SEC review, with the
task of according fair suffrage to shareholders, on the theory that exchanges
are public institutions which make possible wide distributions of securities. 9
When the Exchange Act was broadened in 1964 to permit the SEC to regu-
late securities traded over-the-counter in some of the same ways that ex-
change traded securities had been regulated, the SEC urged that section
14(a) be extended to over-the-counter securities as one means of insuring
annual shareholder elections.
92
The legislative history of the Exchange Act indicates that Congress had
two goals in mind in adopting section 14(a): to promote fair corporate suf-
frage and to curtail management's dominance of the proxy process.
Notwithstanding its potential breadth, section 14(a) generally has been re-
garded primarily as a disclosure rather than a regulatory provision.
Nevertheless, from the time the SEC was established, some of its leaders
have taken the position that the Commission could utilize its powers to
make directors more responsive to the public interest. For example, William
0. Douglas, an early Chairman of the SEC and then Justice of the Supreme
Court, wrote: "Both prior to and during my SEC days I had promoted the
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1982).
90. See SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 847 (1948).
91. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13-14 (1934).
92. Seligman, supra note 2, at 689.
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idea of having 'public' directors of our large corporations. . .. [A]t least
some of the directors of our large corporations must not be subservient to
management. This was a'policy which the SEC had power to enforce."9 3
In the late 1960's and early 1970's the SEC capitalized on a general anti-
business sentiment by devoting significant resources to its management fraud
and sensitive payments programs. The publicity that these programs gener-
ated placed the SEC in the forefront of the corporate governance movement.
In April 1977, the SEC announced public hearings "concerning shareholder
communications, shareholder participation in the corporate electoral process
and, more generally, corporate governance. '" These hearings were part of
a campaign against abusive corporate power and corporate management
misconduct in which the SEC's political range was much broader than inves-
tor protection. In shaping its public hearings, the Commission stated:
While the proxy solicitation process is indeed a central focus of the
present inquiry, it is clear that the issues being studied transcend
the proxy rules in significance, and include the broader and more
fundamental question of how corporations can best be made more
responsive to their shareholders and the public at large. 95
Among the rulemaking proposals generated by the SEC's corporate gov-
ernance program of the late 1970's was a proposed management affiliation
disclosure rule which would have required all corporations subject to the
SEC's proxy rules to label directors as "independent" or "affiliated." 9 6
While the final rules that the SEC adopted were limited to more general
disclosure about directors, boards, and board committees, there was an obvi-
ous effort by the SEC to use such disclosure as a prophylactic device to force
management to include more outside directors on boards.97 The SEC staff
report on corporate accountability which followed the SEC's hearings and
rulemaking proceedings concluded that, although corporate accountability
includes the various ways in which corporations seek to justify actions to all
those affected by corporate activities, including communities, federal, state
and local governments, and the public generally, the SEC could not address
the adequacy of existing accountability mechanisms in serving noninvestor
constituencies. Rather, these "larger corporate accountability issues tran-
scend the jurisdiction and expertise of this Commission and appropriately
93. W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 272 (1974).
94. Exchange Act Release No. 13,482 (Apr. 28, 1977).
95. Exchange Act Release No. 13,901 (Aug. 29, 1977).
96. Exchange Act Release No. 14,970 (July 18, 1978).
97. See Address by Harold M. Williams, Corporate Accountability, Fifth Annual Securi-
ties Regulation Meeting, San Diego, Calif. (Jan. 18, 1978).
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should be considered by others. '"98
Reacting to the SEC's corporate governance hearings and threats of cor-
porate chartering legislation, the business community and corporate lawyers
began considering voluntary measures that might ward off federal legisla-
tion. In November 1976, a subcommittee of the Corporation Banking and
Business Law Committee of the American Bar Association issued the Corpo-
rate Director's Guidebook designed to assist corporate directors in perform-
ing their duties.9 9 In addition, the Business Roundtable issued a report on
the composition of corporate boards of directors in 1978."00
During this debate over corporate governance and reform, the American
Law Institute (ALI) authorized a Corporate Governance Project (the Pro-
ject) under the leadership of former SEC Chairman Ray Garrett, Jr.'O' The
Project has been continuing and has generated considerable controversy. In
part, this is because much of the Project has articulated corporate govern-
ance principles in a statutory format and, therefore, would appear to be a
predicate for federal corporate charter and legislation. Although the Project
does not recommend statutory revision of the proxy provisions of the Ex-
change Act, the thrust of the Project's provisions on board structure and
composition could ultimately federalize corporate governance to an extent
beyond existing law.' 2
B. The Tender Offer Regulations
The Williams Act was added to the Exchange Act in 1968 to enable the
SEC to regulate tender offers, corporate repurchases, and certain related
matters. 0 3 One of the purposes of the Williams Act was to establish a prin-
ciple of neutrality between the bidder and the target in a contested tender
offer. This principle was utilized in Edgar v. MITE Corp. " to invalidate
state legislation that appeared to tip the balance improperly in a contest for
corporate control in favor of the target company.
98. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG., 2D
SESS., SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 33 (Comm. Print 1980).
99. American Bar Ass'n Comm. on Corp. Laws, The Corporate Director's Guidebook, 32
Bus. LAW. 5 (1976).
100. Statement of the Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of
Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2105 (1978).
101. See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: Re-
statement and Recommendations (Tent. Draft No. 1, May 1982).
102. See Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 534 (1984).
103. The Williams Act added §§ 13(d)-(e) and 14(d)-(f) to the Exchange Act (codified at
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f) (1982)).
104. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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More recently in Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 105 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held an Indiana tender offer statute,
which provided for shareholder and disinterested shareholder approval for
voting share acquisitions of 20% or more, unconstitutional on interstate
commerce grounds. This case suggests that the SEC may have the power to
regulate voting rights of common stockholders in contests for corporate
control.
Indeed, the Williams Act may give the SEC considerably more substan-
tive authority with regard to corporate governance; for example, the ability
to outlaw various types of poison pills. 06 Moreover, the all-holders and best
price rules adopted by the SEC go beyond disclosure and impinge upon cor-
porate governance. 107
Federal bills have been introduced in both the House and Senate which
would give the SEC explicit authority over corporate voting rights. Some
bills would compel all public companies to conform to a one share, one vote
standard.'10 Whether the SEC already has the power to compel a one share,
one vote rule for publicly traded securities in the absence of such legislation
is the subject of the SEC proceedings on the NYSE's voting rights propo-
sal."° Other bills would make tender offers subject to a shareholder vote
and would then prevent arbitrageurs from voting on tender offers.1 l0
The ALI Corporate Governance Project would strike an interesting bal-
ance between further regulation, presumably federal, and a market-oriented
approach. This proposal would adopt more rigorous requirements for the
market for corporate control, for example, with respect to safeguarding
shareholder voting rights, but would also permit private ordering, allowing
corporations to adopt charter provisions contrary to such new regula-
tions. 11 This approach also was suggested by recent SEC rulemaking in the
tender offer area. 
1 2
105. 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir.),judgment amended, 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 107
S.Ct. 1637 (1987).
106. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offerer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984); see Exchange
Act Release No. 23,486 (July 31, 1986).
107. Exchange Act Release No. 23,421 (July 11, 1986). Compare Exchange Act Release
No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980) with Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
108. S. 1314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2783, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
109. Exchange Act Release No. 23,803 (Nov. 13, 1986).
110. Ingersoll, Political Pressures Building to Stem Trading Excesses, Wall St. J., Nov. 17,
1986, at 29, col. 5.
111. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 6.01-.04 (American Law Institute Advisory Group Draft No. 7, Sept. 17, 1986).
112. Exchange Act Release No. 23,486 (July 31, 1986).
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IV. NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM REGULATION
The NYSE listing agreement dates back to 1899, and certain requirements
for listing are even older. 1 3 This body of shareholder protection require-
ments has served as a national standard for large public companies in lieu of
any federal or state corporation law regulating a variety of structural govern-
ance matters.
Until 1975, exchange listing standards were clearly the subject of private
or contract law between an SRO and listed companies. The amendments to
the federal securities laws in 1975 gave the SEC certain new powers over
SROs and raise the question of whether shareholder protection features of
listing requirements can be mandated by the SEC. This is a result of the
requirement that the SEC is required to approve or disapprove any proposed
rule or rule change of any SRO," 4 and may also amend and mandate SRO
rules on its own initiative. 1' 5 Although this plenary power over SRO
rulemaking includes passing upon changes in listing requirements," 6 the
SEC must exercise this power with reference to the purposes of the Ex-
change Act.' 1
7
In addition to the SEC's power over SRO rulemaking, the SEC has au-
thority with respect to defining securities qualified for trading in a national
market system (NMS), which also would appear to give the SEC authority
to mandate corporate governance mechanisms for public corporations.
A. SEC Power Over SRO Rulemaking
In 1975, Congress laid the foundation for the establishment of the NMS in
amendments to the Exchange Act. "The rapid attainment of a national mar-
ket system.., is important ... to assure that the country maintains a strong,
effective and efficient capital raising and capital allocating system in the
years ahead."' 8
Without mandating specific components of the NMS or even defining the
term, Congress vested the SEC with broad flexible authority to design, im-
plement, and regulate the NMS. In the statute, two significant new powers
were given to the SEC: the power in sections 19(b) and (c) of the Exchange
113. Exchange Act Release No. 13,346 (Mar. 9, 1977).
114. Exchange Act, § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1982).
115. Exchange Act, § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982).
116. Rule 19b-4 under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (1986); see In re Tor-
rington, 19 S.E.C. 39 (1945); see also § 1 1A(c)(4)(A) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-
l(c)(4)(A) (1982).
117. Exchange Act, §§ 19(b)(2) & 19(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)(2) & 78s(c) (1982).
118. S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1975) [hereinafter Senate Report].
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Act" 19 to approve, disapprove, abrogate, add to or delete from rules adopted
by SROs, and the power in section 1 IA(a)(2) of the Exchange Act to "desig-
nate the securities... qualified for trading in the national market system...
(qualified securities)." 20
The SEC's authority under section 19 is limited to actions in "furtherance
of the purposes" of the Exchange Act. 2 ' If the SEC should determine that
voting rights for common stockholders are in furtherance of the objectives of
the proxy and tender offer regulations, a rule for all SROs on the subject
presumably would be in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange Act. It
should be noted that any amendments to any SRO rules mandated by the
SEC remain rules of the SRO and do not become SEC rules.
12 2
Although some commentators have questioned whether the SEC has the
authority to require SROs to adopt qualitative governance standards for
listed securities, as Justice Holmes once regarded, "a page of history is worth
a volume of logic. ' "12 Where Congress has presumed regulatory authority
to exist at the SRO level, subject to SEC oversight, it would be anomalous
for the SEC not to be able to act to maintain the viability of prior regulatory
requirements. Furthermore, in the case of certain new substantive regula-
tions, such as the requirement for independent directors on audit commit-
tees, the SEC previously has taken an active role in the formulation of SRO
rules which regulate corporate structure. 1
24
B. Definition of Qualified Securities
In addition to the generalized power over SRO rulemaking contained in
section 19, the SEC has the authority to establish criteria for "qualified se-
curities." Although this authority is not limited by the statute on its face, it
is limited implicitly by the objectives of the NMS. One of these principles is
that the securities qualified to be included in the NMS should depend pri-
marily on their trading characteristics, rather than where they happen to be
traded. The Senate Report accompanying the 1975 amendments, for exam-
ple, noted that "many securities do not have the characteristics-e.g., trad-
ing volume, price, and number of stockholders-which would justify
auction-type trading."
' 12 5
Also, one of the statutory findings added to the Exchange Act in 1975
119. Exchange Act, §§ 19(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b)-(c) (1982).
120. Exchange Act, § 1 lA(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78kA(a) (1982).
121. Exchange Act, § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982).
122. Exchange Act, § 19(c)(4)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78a(c)(4)(C) (1982).
123. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
124. See SEC STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 98, at 642-47.
125. Senate Report, supra note 118, at 16.
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states that it is in the "public interest and appropriate for the protection of
investors and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets to assure... fair
competition . . among exchange markets, and between exchange markets
and markets other than exchange markets."
' 126
In giving the SEC authority to define "qualified securities" it would ap-
pear that Congress intended the SEC to equalize listing standards of compet-
ing marketplaces, if this were necessary to achieve the statutory purposes
enumerated above. To the extent that such traditional standards are qualita-
tive and relate to corporate governance matters, the SEC would appear to
have the capacity to establish standards on voting rights for publicly traded
securities. '
27
Recently, much focus has been on the one share, one vote NYSE listing
standard. However, the foregoing analysis would apply to certain other cor-
porate governance rulemaking as well; for example, the NYSE requirement
that public companies have a minimum number of independent directors
generally and on audit committees. In that connection, the NASD has pro-
posed to establish certain corporate governance standards pertaining to in-
dependent directors. 
1 28
C. Additional Sources of Authority
Finally, some mention should be made of section 23(a) of the Exchange
Act, which authorizes the SEC to adopt such rules and regulations as may
be necessary or appropriate to implement the provisions of that Act, as well
as section 14(e) of the Exchange Act, which similarly gives the SEC author-
ity to promulgate rules designed to prevent violations of the Williams Act.
So long as a rule promulgated pursuant to such general rulemaking author-
ity is "reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation it will be
sustained."' 2 9 The SEC could utilize this authority to pass regulations af-
fecting corporate governance if the rules were designed to implement the
proxy, tender offer, or national market system provisions of the Exchange
Act, all of which are predicated upon fairness to investors. The extent to
which such rulemaking could impose substantive fairness requirements that
go beyond disclosure and exceed the requirements of state law is, however, a
perplexing question. 13
0
126. Exchange Act, § I A(a)(1)(C)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(l)(C)(ii) (1982).
127. Letter from Milton H. Cohen to John P. Wheeler, Secretary SEC, File S7-37-84, Feb.
8, 1985, discussed in Exchange Act Release No. 22,412 (Sept. 16, 1985).
128. Exchange Act Release No. 22,506 (Oct. 4, 1985).
129. Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
130. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
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V. CONCLUSION
Although the SEC has ample authority to formulate a voting rights policy
for public companies, the exercise of such authority would be an unprece-
dented regulation of corporate governance. Therefore, although the perma-
nent management entrenchment which dual class capitalizations permit is
contrary to the principle of investor protection in the federal securities laws,
the SEC perhaps will not go so far as to mandate a one share, one vote rule.
In its release ordering hearings on the NYSE's proposed listing standard
changes, the SEC suggested a number of possible regulations which might
permit some public companies to have dual class capitalizations, but require
companies which have an existing one share, one vote standard to maintain
such a capitalization.
The difficult public policy question that the SEC must confront is whether
shareholders should be denied the freedom to bargain away their voting
rights. Although state blue sky merit statutes have so limited corporate cap-
italizations, it can be anticipated that the SEC will approach such regulation
cautiously and formulate a federal voting rights policy with extreme
reluctance.
VI. ADDENDUM
In the five months since the completion of this article the SEC encouraged
voluntary SRO rulemaking in an attempt to resolve the difficult legal and
political problems involved in formulating a federal voting rights stan-
dard."' Although the NASD was willing to promulgate a voting rights
rule, the Amex refused to compromise its position. As a result, no uniform
rule across all public marketplaces was achieved.
132
In the meantime, shareholder voting rights have been further undermined
by an increasing number of dual class recapitalizations involving shareholder
disenfranchisement and rule proposals by the NYSE and the Pacific Coast
Stock Exchange to amend their voting rights listing standards.'3 3 Also, the
Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.
of America 134 and upheld the Indiana antitakeover law at issue. The Court
did not overrule Edgar v. MITE Corp., 135 but rather distinguished it, on the
ground that the Indiana statute "protects the independent shareholder
131. Ingersoll, SEC Chief Says Voting-Rights Pact Is Near, Wall St. J., June 1, 1987, at 4,
col. 1.
132. See Voting Rights Listing Standards, Exchange Act Release No. 24,623, 52 Fed. Reg.
23,665, 23,666-67 (June 24, 1987).
133. Id. at 23,666.
134. 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987).
135. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
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against both of the contending parties" in a takeover.' 3 6 Thus, the principle
of neutrality upon which the Williams Act rests was not offended. Never-
theless, the Court underlined the interests of the states in corporate govern-
ance by asserting that "[n]o principle of corporation law and practice is
more firmly established than a state's authority to define the voting rights of
shareholders."137 The reality, however, is that state corporate law does not
protect shareholder voting rights.13
Confronted with the need to take some action with respect to the NYSE's
proposed change in its listing requirements, the SEC finally instituted pro-
ceedings to "consider whether to adopt a rule which would have the effect of
amending the rules of" national stock exchanges and the NASD to prohibit
publicly traded companies from "issu[ing] securities or taking other corpo-
rate action that would have the effect of nullifying, restricting or disparately
reducing the voting rights of existing shareholders of the company.
' 1 3 9
Much of the SEC's notice of proposed rulemaking was devoted to a discus-
sion of its legal authority to intrude into corporate governance by passing a
voting rights rule. Although the Commission concluded that it has such
authority under section 19(c) of the Exchange Act, it also relied heavily
upon its powers under the proxy provisions. " Interestingly, the SEC's re-
lease does not rely upon or even discuss its powers under the Williams Act.
Accordingly, the question of whether, under the rationale of the Supreme
Court in CTS, proposed rule 19c-4 would preempt a state antitakeover law
will have to wait for another day.
Because rulemaking under section 19(c) of the Exchange Act requires
public hearings, which the SEC scheduled for July 11, 1987, it can be antici-
pated that the debate over whether the SEC has the authority to pass a vot-
ing rights rule, and the form any such rule should take, can be expected to
continue until after the publication of this article.
136. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. at 1645.
137. Id. at 1649.
138. See Karmel, Shareholder Voting Rights Diminishing Under State Law, N.Y.L.J., June
18, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
139. See Voting Rights Listing Standards, supra note 132.
140. Id. at 23,675-76; see also id. at 23,678 (concurring statement of Commissioner
Fleischman).
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